HISTORY OF SERB-ALBANIAN RELATIONS

Under the Byzantine Empire Kosovo and parts of Albania were populated by agriculturalist Slavs in the plains and valleys while pastoralist Vlachs, Illyrians, Albanians, Dardanians and Thracians held the highlands. There is no evidence that the ancient Illyrians were Albanians. Since the Illyrians, before they were absorbed by the Romans, did not have a written language, Venetians, Dalmatians, Croats, Montenegrins, and Albanians, all can claim ancient but unprovable Illyrian roots.

After a period within the Bulgarian Empire, and another period of Byzantine rule, in 1180 Kosovo became part of the Serb state. In 1219 the Kosovar town of Pec became the seat of the Serb Orthodox church, against which the Pope organized crusades. The Battle of Kosovo Polje (which in Serb means Field of Blackbirds) was fought in 1389 and saw the Christian armies, led by Prince Lazar of Serbia, Tvrtko, King of Bosnia and Serbia, and their Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Albanian allies, challenging the invading armies of Emir Murad and his vassals. That battle was a draw--both Prince Lazar and Emir Murad were killed-- but in later battles the Christians were defeated and most of the Balkans were conquered. Originally, Ottoman rule was definitely more rational and tolerant than that of any contemporary European state. Any conquered prince or village chief, if he converted to Islam, would be accepted as an equal of the Ottomans and would see his own wealth and power increase, at the expense of those who remained Christians. Nevertheless, Christians and Jews were tolerated, although converts were favored. With time, the converts became owners of ever greater spreads of land, worked by their Christian serfs, who in Bosnia and Kosovo happened to be mostly Serbs.

THE CHRISTIAN PROBLEM IN KOSOVO

Sometimes converts or immigrants are embarrassed by their origins, and to prove their dedication to their new faith or country, they are likely to turn vicious against their infidel uncivil cousins. Often amongst the cruelest persecutors you find people whose grandparents were from the persecuted group. As the formerly Christian Albanians became the rulers of the land, it became very uncomfortable to be a Christian in Albania and in Kosovo. One half of the population of Albania escaped to Italy, while most of the other half converted. Many of the Serbs of Kosovo escaped north, in successive waves, to escape the rule of Albanian converts or the avenging Ottoman armies, which arrived after every failed Serb insurrection. Serbs peasants were replaced by Albanians from the Kosovo highlands or from northern Albania. About the year 1800 things began to get worse still: in more tolerant days, all that Serbs had to do was to accept serfdom under an Albanian bey or pasha or under a Bosnian beg. Now a particularly demanding Albanian pasha might simply kill Serbs unwilling to convert or destroy their village. Some Serbs who chose conversion to Islam remained crypto-Christians and for many years maintained Christian traditions within the home. Persecution of crypto-Christians was initiated, and after a few generations, through intermarriage, all converted Serbs were absorbed into the Albanian population. What often remained was awareness of blood ties and of an ancient shared history, as well as common traditions and bilingualism.

There is no record of organized violence between Serbs or Montenegrins and Albanians until 1785, when an Albanian army, under the nominal sovereignty of the Sultan in Istambul, invaded Montenegro. After 11 years of fighting the Albanians had to withdraw and Montenegro remained an autonomous principality within the Ottoman Empire. In 1875 an agrarian insurrection against the Moslem landlord and tax collector started in Bosnia and turned into a national Serb revolution, which found support and volunteers amongst European liberals, particularly the followers of Mazzini and Garibaldi. At the end of Tolstoy's Ana Kerenina, we see Prince Vronsky on his way to the Balkans as one such volunteer. The Bosnian Serbs proclaimed their union to Serbia,--they were the majority then in Bosnia -- but Austria had other plans for the area. In a secret agreement, concluded in Budapest, Vienna and St. Petersburg divided the Balkans into spheres of influence. The Czar declared war against the Sultan. With the aid of forces from Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Serbia, the Ottoman armies were defeated and a peace treaty was signed, which gave parts of Kosovo to Serbia and Montenegro, while Bulgaria got Macedonia and independence. But Berlin--and Vienna, Rome, London, and Paris-- didn't like that one bit, and paternally told the little Slavs, "Give it back immediately!" Which they did, while Bulgaria had to accept autonomy instead of independence. That was the Congress of Berlin, 1878, whose big winner was Austria-Hungary, which grabbed Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Sanjak.

The Ottoman Empire tried reforms and gave equal rights to the Christians. This offended the Albanians, who saw themselves taxed just like Christians, just like the "rayah", a Turkish word that means herd. That is the traditional term of reference for Christians, seen as a herd whose purpose in life is to be fleeced. Ottoman rule was now very weak and became definitely unable to protect its Serb subjects. During the previous war the Slavic armies had terrorized the Albanians, while Albanian irregulars had terrorized the Serbs in Kosovo. The restoration of formal Ottoman rule meant actual control by the Albanians, which did not bode well for the Christians. Robbery, beatings, rape, and murder of Serbs by Albanians came to be commonplace in Kosovo. Raiding Serb towns became a conventional way of making a living. Raids were made against towns in Serbia proper as well as against Serb towns in Kosovo. In 1901 Albanian bands raided Novi Pazar and Pristina, the raids regularly turning into pogroms. A very impractical thing to do, since if you kill a Serb or you burn down his house, you will not be able to raid his house next year. A pogrom, by the way, is an event in which the "boys" run down the street beating up Jews and knocking over their produce carts. If the "boys" are really upset they might have to set the Jews' stores on fire. Of course, if the Jews insist on living above their store and their apartment burns down, it's not your fault if they lose their family, they were asking for it, living next to a legitimate strategic target. Collateral damage and all that, as they say in Brussels. That's the way it goes with pogroms, whether those who are catching hell be Jews, Christians, Moslems, Hindus, Blacks, Koreans, Albanians, or Serbs.

In between pogroms Serbs in Kosovo had to keep a low profile. For example, it wasn't wise for Serbs to paint their houses or in some other way make them look fancier than their Albanian neighbors'. In one Kosovo town it was customary for the town crier to end every announcement with the cry, "Woe unto him who is a Christian." Vienna's agents stirred up unrest in the expectation that chaos would enable Austria-Hungary to occupy the area as it had done in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Kosovar Albanian notables visited Belgrade as honored guests and were offered gifts and arms to encourage them to protect Kosovo Serbs. In 1903 the Macedonians rose up; the bashibazouks, mostly Albanian irregular forces, were sent to crush the uprising.

In 1908 the Young Turk government in Istambul attempted the centralization of the empire and mandated Turkish language instruction, military service, and higher taxes. Kosovo Albanians revolted and the Turkish reaction was severe. 50,000 Albanians and 100,000 Serbs fled Kosovo. Serbia and Montenegro began to support Albanian guerrilla leaders like Isa Boletini and Idriz Seferi, who in exchange protected Kosovo's Serbs. Seferi had some of his followers shot for robbing Serbs and Boletini had Serbs amongst his most trusted men. However, when Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia went to war against the Ottoman Empire, the Albanians sided with Istambul. " Better the devil you know..." Albanians thus became victims of generalized killing and pillage at the hands of the victorious Balkan armies. Serb forces reached the sea but Vienna and Rome announced that this would not be tolerated. It was Austria's policy that Serbia should never be allowed to have a port on the Adriatic. Italy's objective was control of both sides of the Adriatic. The Italians landed and fought off Greeks and Serbs. Austria and Italy were then allied in the Triple Alliance, whose third member was Germany. They supported a convention of feudal lords from all over Albania, which proclaimed Albania's independence in Vlora in 1912. The Treaty of London of 1913 recognized an independent Albania, but the settlement of her final borders was postponed. Serbia lost access to the sea but kept most of Kosovo.

World War I saw general mayhem between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo, the Austro-Hungarian invasion of Serbia, one year of Serb resistance, the German and Bulgarian invasion, the loss of Serbia and the epic retreat to the sea of the Serb army through Kosovo and Albania. Serbia lost 1/2 of its men of fighting age (18-55) in battle, famine, typhus, massacre, Austrian gallows and concentration camps. A good German line of the time was "Serbien muss sterben," meaning, "Serbia must die."

The Italians occupied Albania --they had been promised half of Albania in the 1915 Treaty of London--and an Italian general proclaimed once again Albanian independence, "under the friendship and protection of Italy" in June 1917. In 1918 the Serb army came back to Kosovo. The Italians financed Albanian guerrillas against Serbia. The Serbs reacted with massacres. Amnesty was offered in 1921, but the guerrillas surrendered in the fall only to return to the hills in spring, just as had been the practice of outlaws in the Ottoman Empire. The new ruler of Albania, who later became King Zog, decided to kill the rebel leaders and the Yugoslav amnesty of 1924 put an end to the rebellion. King Zog followed a middle line, now leaning towards Italy, now towards Yugoslavia, but when he went as far as marrying a Hungarian countess instead of an Italian princess, Mussolini decided he had enough of this all too independent king, ordered a Constituent Assembly of Albanian feudal and clan lords and asked it to offer the crown to the King of Italy. It was promptly done as ordered. Mussolini's explicit order to the new governor was that Albanian irredentist feelings towards Greece and Yugoslavia be encouraged.

World War II saw Kosovo divided between Germany, Italy, and Bulgaria. Italy formed Albanian units, which were used in the "pacification" of Greece. Balli Kombetar, the National Union, which has often been said to be the nationalist resistance to the Axis, was allied to the SS Skandenbeg division, an Albanian unit with German officers, which concerned itself with the final solution of both the Jewish and the Christian problem in Albania. In the place of killed or expelled Serbs and Jews came 70,000 settlers from Albania. The Italian army tried to protect the Serbs, but the greatest help it could really provide was transportation out of Kosovo. Balli Kombetar could be argued to be part of the Albanian resistance if by "resistance" you mean beating up or killing Italians, after Italy switched to the allied side in 1943. Partisan units in Kosovo attracted thousands of Serbs and Montenegrins but a rather small number of Albanians. Although the defeats of the Axis showed that the end was in sight, the killings of Serbs continued, even though Albanian elders questioned the wisdom of such a policy. I944 saw the retreat of the Germans, the Yugoslav partisans' takeover, the suicidal insurrection of Kosovo's Balli Kombetar, and the settling of accounts: during and after very heavy fighting, thousands of Albanians were killed.

PEACE, SELF-RULE, AND POGROMS

The end of the war saw a new, young, strong, confident government, still animated by a spirit of idealism, certain of the coming of a bright new (red) dawn, a new society, even a new civilization. Milovan Djlas quotes Tito as saying, after a bout of killings in 1945, " Enough of all these death sentences and all this killing! The death sentence no longer has any effect! No one fears death any more." So they stopped most of the killing and did not expel the Albanians, as the Greek government did, without any important person in Paris, London, or Washington noticing it. Albanian language schools were opened, and higher education was opened to Albanians. Albanian flags, however, were not permitted, and flag raising was cause for arrest.

In 1969 the Albanian, Serbo-Croat, and Turkish languages achieved equal status in Kosovo, while the independent University of Pristina was established. In 1974 Kosovo became one of the eight federal units of Yugoslavia. The national nine-member collective leadership consisted of President Tito and one member for each federal unit. This meant that as long as Tito lived --he was president for life--there would be an Albanian vice-president for a year, a Croat next year, then a Slovenian, etc. After Tito died there would be a collective presidency of eight members, one of whom was to be an Albanian. Kosovo now had representation on the federal courts and on the constitutional court --the equivalent of the U.S. Supreme Court. It had a veto on all Serb legislation affecting it, while Serbia could not veto a law passed in Kosovo, which now had its own government, parliament, police, judiciary, and supreme court. In the field of public service 80% of all jobs were reserved for Albanians and knowledge of Albanian became mandatory and sufficient. Albanian literature and culture flourished, but a university degree in albanology or Islamic studies did not offer opportunities as an engineering degree would.

Most of Yugoslavia's development fund went to Kosovo but the high birthrate, three times the Yugoslav average, insured poverty. As youth unemployment increased, the Albanian government of Kosovo tried solving the problem by providing opportunities and funds for higher education, in Albanian, countering a tradition of bilingualism or trilingualism--Albanian, Serb, And Turkish. That decision of the Albanian leadership was quite catastrophic, since it ghettoized Albanians. It is not easy today in Kosovo to find young Albanians who speak Serb, or any foreign language at that. All successful, affluent minorities are bilingual. What was created was a class of dissatisfied intellectuals without prospects of translating their humanities degrees into jobs, while the development of university facilities did not keep pace with the increase in the number of students.

Students were unhappy with the food and with conditions in general at the university. The government and the university were totally in the hands of Albanians, but a culprit had to be found. In some places you naturally blame the Jews, in some places you blame the Muslims, in Kosovo you blame the Christians. So on March 26, 1981 the first pogrom since World War II took place in Pristina. Instead of Jews, the targets were Serbs and Montenegrins, who were attacked, their homes and shops looted and set on fire. The army intervened to quell the riots and perhaps one hundred Albanians were killed. This, however, was not a riot like the Watts, Newark, or Detroit riots of the 1960's. In Pristina policemen were killed. Certainly it would have been wiser to use less force to end the riots, certainly there was no need for the type of repression that followed. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the Yugoslavs had succeeded in breaking with the brutal history of massacre and revenge that had afflicted Kosovo. The Albanians in Kosovo had obtained more rights than any minority in any contested area in the world, and had more economic, religious, political, and educational freedoms and opportunities than Albanians in Albania. But this was not sufficient to break that old custom of beating up Christians when you can get away with it. The autonomous Albanian government allowed Albanians to get away with it.

From Migration of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo by R.Petrovic and M.Blagojevic, published in Belgrade in 1989 I quote the words of an old Serbian farmer:

In the...sixties, Serbs suddenly began to migrate...For days on end, horse-drawn carts packed packed with belongings... passed through my village, by my home...I stood before them and said: "People, where are you going, why are you leaving your land, your homes, Kosovo"...the answer invariably was, we can no longer bear the terror, my friend, the daily assaults on our women, children, old folk, our property, the beatings we have to take and the swear words flung at us, we are leaving so that our children can live in freedom."

Altering the balance of power between nationalities through intimidation or terror is ethnic cleansing. In 1989, to put a stop to such ethnic cleansing Milosevic withdrew the autonomy and reincorporated Kosovo into Serbia. I would not deny that this was done undiplomatically, and that there was no real effort to give incentives to Albanian leaders willing to cooperate with Serbia. Nevertheless, the action of Milosevic, though heavy-handed, was essentially defensive in nature.

The recent armed struggle has caused the ethnic cleansing process to accelerate. Many villages have been totally cleansed of Serbs. Serbs, Montenegrins, as well as Romany or even Albanians unwilling to work with the KLA, are robbed or beaten. Some may be beaten to death. Sometimes their tortured bodies are found, sometimes they just disappear. Human remains were found in the village of Klecka, where a limestone kiln was used as crematorium for 22 people whom the KLA did not like. It's unfortunate that since the governments of NATO countries decided to take sides in this conflict, the western media have found it inappropriate to involve unpleasantries like Klecka into the general discussion of Kosovo.

A RATIONAL SOLUTION OF THE BALKAN PROBLEM: LAND FOR PEACE Pristina, March 21, 1999

Nations can be induced to or can be forced to give up territory. But every nation has some land of symbolic value that it cannot give up, unless it is crushed first. Even then, the giving up of symbolic land is temporary, and irredentism starts, which will bring back an even bloodier war, sooner or later. You cannot expect Israel to give up Jerusalem even under threat of death and extinction. Could it be true that the Serbs' feelings for Kosovo are of such a nature? The western press has tried to minimize such feelings. An example is the Reuters report from Belgrade, dated March 17, which seems to suggest that folks probably went to a government-organized rally for Kosovo because they got a day off and a free trip. A very sensible conclusion, why else go to a boring rally , where you have to listen to and applaud patriotic speeches? But here comes the clincher: "Outside on the street, people went about their business, immune to the patriotic fever inside." A rational person would conclude from reading the article that the people of Yugoslavia do not really care that much about Kosovo, and that their patriotism is a matter of convenience, easy to be turned off or on. A person who is as ignorant of the history of this region as western editors and western leaders are, would rationally conclude the the Belgrade government is just waiting to to have its arm twisted a bit , that it might put up some pro-forma resistance and then quit. An extremely dangerous conclusion. Everything I have read about this country suggests otherwise. Every person I have spoken to, without exceptions, speaks of Kosovo in terms similar to what Israelis say about Jerusalem. There is no Israel without Jerusalem, and there is no Serbia without Kosovo. The Serbs would have to be crushed by fire before they give it up. Fear of fire is insufficient. Everyone here says that if Milosevic tried to give up Kosovo he would be overthrown faster than Prince Paul's government, when he signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany in 1941.

Serbs have a national tradition of doing crazy things. In 1914 they could not accept that ultimatum from the Austro-Hungarian empire, even though it was backed by the German Empire, they were pretty much surrounded by enemies, had no access to the sea, and their only friends were very far, in St. Petersburg. In 1941 at the height of Hitler's power, when European leaders were rushing to Berlin with hat in hand to see what the leader of the master race desired--a non-aggression treaty, some nice new special law for the Jews, maybe some iron ore, or unhindered passage for German forces--Belgrade challenged Hitler. It was utter madness, and they paid for it. In 1948, when there was still great hostility between Yugoslavia and the western nations, so that no help could be expected from the west in case of war, Belgrade challenged the mighty Soviet Union. Stalin had said, "I will shake my little finger and Tito will fall." It did not happen, and Stalin was smart enough not to step into the Balkan quicksands. The Serbs' feelings and their history speak quite clearly: if NATO wants Kosovo, it will have to go to war to get it.

Fortunately there are alternatives to war. Since neither Serbs nor Albanians are wrong in Kosovo, since both sides are moved by perfectly rational fears, western countries should intervene as mediators, not as cops, who suffer from a tendency to decide that the guy who talks back is the bad guy. Impartial intervention years ago, before all this blood was shed, could have obtained an agreement on a bicameral parliament, with a nationality chamber in which each nation had veto rights. Now it is too late for that. The only possible solution is the Palestinian solution. Partition. In the case of Palestine, everyone, except for religious fanatics, recognizes that partition was the only sensible solution in 1948 and that partition of the territories conquered by Israel in 1967 will be the only possible solution. Land for peace. If Israel wants peace it has to give up land, not to some weak and humiliated "Palestinian entity", but to a Palestinian state. That's partition.

The Israelis have not as yet fully accepted the "land for peace" solution. It will not be easy to persuade the Yugoslavs to accept it. The means of persuasion have to be the same ones which are normally used in normal diplomatic negotiations, by normal diplomats, not big stick diplomats. Give and take. Incentives. There are no demands that NATO bomb Israel to persuade it to compromise. The condition of Palestinians in Lebanon in 1982, after the Israeli invasion, was much worse than that of Albanians in Kosovo today. In Palestinian refugees camps the killing started after the the PLO soldiers left the area. The victims were in excess of one thousand in a couple of days. No fighting was involved, children were killed, but NATO did not consider bombing Israel.

In Racak, after a day of heavy fighting which included mortars on the KLA side and artillery on the Yugoslav side, forty-five villagers were found dead. A number of reports suggest that this was not a massacre but a case of rearranging battle dead in order to make it appear a massacre, with the intent of creating a casus belli, an excuse to go to war.. This is a kinder variant of the Islamic Bosnian government penchant for bombing its own markets and bread lines in order to garnish western sympathy and air support.

Compare the reaction of NATO countries to a very doubtful atrocity in Kosovo and a very obvious atrocity in Lebanon. In Kosovo, indignation, followed by bombing threats. In Lebanon, an offer of peacekeepers, followed by intervention on the side of those who had committed the massacre. U.S. behavior in Lebanon could be justified on the basis of supporting old trusted allies and opposing their enemies. U.S. behavior in Kosovo, involving support of a terrorist organization, is in contempt of every international law on the book, and is particularly odd since it goes against recognized American interests, and in contempt of geopolitical realities. Staggering is the level of ignorance shown by NATO policy makers regarding Balkan history and present realities. The Balkans tremble, dumbstruck in horror, as sophomoric apprentice wizards set about casting powerful spells, the very spells which in the past have been sufficient to materialize out of thin air, that wondrous chimaera, religious war.

THE FUTURE BALKAN WARS

Yugoslavs fear that war will resume in Bosnia when the Moslems feel they are strong enough. In view of the persecutions they were subjected to in the seventies and eighties during the years of Albanian autonomy they believe that autonomy means expulsion of all minorities from Kosovo. They believe that even if they had the option of giving up Kosovo there would still be demands for the Sanjak and for pieces of Montenegro. They fear that ethnic cleansing of the Serbs still in Croatia could resume and that the western nations would not object to it, just as they did not raise a finger when hundreds of thousands of Serbs were expelled just a few years ago, with generally recognized US government complicity. They feel that they are being asked to give up all of Kosovo for nothing. An odd negotiating position for NATO to take. A rational proposal would be giving up some of Kosovo for peace. Not just peace in Kosovo, but peace and security throughout the territory of the Second Yugoslavia.

Western policy makers and editors, in their abysmal ignorance of the Balkans, think that the issue is just one of Serb versus Albanian. They are totally unaware of the fact that the multiethnicity of the Second Yugoslavia has been transferred to the Third Yugoslavia, where Serbs, Montenegrins, Albanians, Hungarians, Romany, Romanians, Croats, Turks, Slavic Moslems, Jews and other minorities still perfectly coexist, at least in all areas not as yet chosen by western leaders for destabilization. Many Albanians, Croats and Slavic Moslems live in Belgrade, without suffering any trace of oppression. The same cannot be said about Kosovo, where western money--obtained through the drug trade, donations from Albanian emigrants, and western assistance--has pushed the most chauvinist Albanian ideologists to the fore. Besides the Serbs, all Albanians and Romany who may be seen as uncooperative with the local KLA faction are killed, and all Kosovo minorities live in fear. A rational solution of the Kosovo problem would involve the peaceful partition of Kosovo, with western cash helping the resettlement of the people to the areas of their choices. Most Albanians would choose to reside in Albanian control areas, but many would choose to remain in Yugoslavia. Their motives would be family or professional ties to Yugoslavia, fear of the organizations supported by the west, or unwillingness to relocate from Serb control areas. Once such solution is accepted for Kosovo, it will automatically become the solution of choice for Macedonia.

The only alternative is war in Macedonia. Macedonians believe that after Kosovo is in the bag, they are next. They fear that the American umbrella will not help them one bit against Albanian guerrilla activities or terrorism. They see war coming, a war that might spread to the Greek minority in Albania and the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, thus involving the whole Balkan peninsula in warfare. So the time to negotiate is before the war starts. Once it starts in Macedonia, there will be victims, there will be atrocities, and compromise will be harder to achieve. When Serbs and Macedonians, just like the Israelis, say that their borders are not negotiable, they are following normal human behavior, based on territorial instinct. The job of western diplomacy should be to convince them that a territorial compromise is in their interest, that a rational demographic policy would support partition, that the economic advantages of partition would be great, and that economic integration would soon make the new borders much less important. Today European borders are open. Usually you do not have to stop at the border, usually you just slow down. The oppression of minorities which was normal in Europe 40 years ago is today unthinkable. People change country without difficulty. Such is a future which western diplomats should be offering to the Balkan countries. Instead, western "diplomats" have just bombs in the briefcase, and instead of economic incentives there is a stream of insults directed at the men with whom they have to negotiate, and threats, directed of course against only one of the parties.

Moreover, such "diplomacy" ignores the realities of the ground. Thus it supports Albanian nationalism in Kosovo but denies it in Macedonia while it simply ignores Slav nationalism anywhere. It is as if these western rulers had received their training on video games, where nothing can happen which is not in the program. They wrote the program, thus only what they expect to happen can happen. Just as some young people can become lost in Dungeons and Dragons or in a computer game and actually come to accept directions for the real world from a fantasy, so have western rulers come to believe the fantasy world they have created.

THE LOGIC OF WAR

People here keep asking me how could the US be orchestrating the rise to power, in Kosovo, of an organization that is currently engaged in placing bombs at the market and in tossing grenades into coffee houses. I have to answer that long term solutions and long term possible damage do not concern the rulers of the west. The objective of western diplomacy has been the achievement of "feel good" victories, good enough to hold us until the next election. "Apres nous le deluge," as King Louis XV of France said. "After us, let the deluge come." A catastrophic error was made in Afghanistan, where the US gave massive aid to groups which in the 1970's specialized in shooting in the legs women in western dress and now are attacking American embassies. Yet President Carter and President Reagan are not blamed for creating modern Islamic extremism with their misguided Afghanistan policies. Thus President Clinton may trust that his Balkan policies will not be challenged by American historians. The thinking of the adepts of gunboat diplomacy today is the same as it was 100 years ago: we must show that it does not pay to disobey Washington, we cannot afford to lose face. The thinking of the rulers has not changed since the Trojan war. Einstein wrote that everything has changed except the way in which our minds work. The threat of nuclear war is ignored. The threat of terrorism is ignored. The threat of regional destabilization is ignored.

The history of the world is a history of threats, actions, and reprisals punctuated by occasional periods of diplomacy. In periods of diplomacy we follow aristotelean logic, during the rest of history we follow an ancient system of logic called "paleologic" by the psychiatrist Silvano Arieti. Paleologic is the logic that humans often make use of, for example in dreams, in early childhood, under the spell of certain mental diseases, and in time of conflict, whether it be conflict between spouses, brothers, clans, or nations. The finest , most cultured, practical, and sensible people start acting like hostile drunks in time of conflict. Paleologic makes us very sure of ourselves, makes us take risks that would be unacceptable under aristotelean logic, makes us accept conclusions that everyone outside the conflict sees as totally insensate. A person, a general, a president working under the spell of paleologic is absolutely sure of victory. Success appears then inescapable, and a man sees nothing odd in pulling the trigger during a little bout of Russian roulette. Paleologic deprives us of our ability to use our human advanced skills, such as diplomacy, in favor of more primitive ones, such as threats and violence. Paleologic blocks advanced feelings like shame and guilt and it enhances primitive feelings like fear of people we do not know--such as those evil people across the creek who are well known to consort with demons-- and the fear of losing face. Diplomats whose brain is working in paleologic mode make public threats while Aristotelean diplomats privately point out to their opponents the disadvantages of their position. Paleologic diplomats lead their countries to war because they turn disagreements into matters of face.

Going back to the issue at hand, paleologic does not allow western nations to realize the absurdity of the gambles they are taking, nor their guilt and responsibility in the destruction of the second Yugoslavia, the start and prosecution of the war in Bosnia, the expulsion of more than half million of Serbs, and the beginning of the war in Kosovo. In the same way, paleologic does not allow the Serbs to see their own faults. Serbs have suffered violence and oppression at the hands of Albanians, and paleologic tells them, "We are victims, thus we cannot be oppressors." Serbs do not believe that their forces have been involved in violence and oppression against Albanians. As a neutral observer, I believe otherwise. I know of the atrocities committed by the Albanians against the Serbs since the 1970's and I expect that the Serbs, in the course of this guerrilla war, have been answering in kind. War cannot fail to increase the level of brutality, it has always done so, and I do not see any reason to expect that it will be different in this coming war.

I expect that NATO leaders, having made public threats, afraid of losing face, will take us to war. NATO intervention will result in generalized ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, with the Serbs and the Albanians burning each other's villages. However, since the Serbs are militarily stronger, the Albanians will suffer most. Albanians are terrified of what may happen if NATO starts bombing. The most experienced amongst western reporters here are also very pessimistic, but they know that their editors do not want to give prominence to negativism, at the beginning of a crusade: crusades sell newspapers. The only people who are not worried at all are western leaders and generals we see on CNN. They do not mind betting the farm on the idea that their ultimatum will bring peace: the farm they are betting belongs to someone else.

WAR, ADVERTISING, AND REFUGEES Belgrade, March 31, 1999

The refugees' humanitarian catastrophe, which is pre-eminent in the western view of the Kosovo situation, is recognized as being a major issue also in Belgrade. Yugoslav television has shown crowds of refugees leaving Kosovo for Macedonia, but the emphasis here is on people leaving for Serbia and Montenegro. They are mostly Serbs, Montenegrins, and Roms (Gypsies) but also include some Albanians. There are maybe 100,000 Albanians living in Belgrade, and some Kosovo Albanians find refuge in Belgrade with their relatives. Refugees arriving in Belgrade say that they run from US bombing. On the basis of western reporting from Pristina and of observation of bombing damage that we see on television, it seems reasonable to accept that explanation. US bombing caused refugee humanitarian catastrophes in Europe in WW2, in Korea, and in Vietnam. It is silly to claim that our bombs are now nice and do not spread panic amongst the population any more. Which of course does not exclude terror by gunmen or police.

The KLA guerrillas, since the beginning of their military confrontation with the Yugoslav army have created fortified positions in their own villages. When you choose such tactics you in effect ask for your house to be shelled. It is a primitive defensive tactic, such that no successful guerrilla force has ever employed. That explains some of the damage, but I do not doubt that there has been some intentional torching of Albanian villages. During the Vietnam that was called a "Zippo raid". Unfortunately, that's war. In the human species we have an unfortunate tendency to set enemy houses on fire. We have been doing it since the good old paleolithic times and we continue to do it in wartime, unless our commanding officers be prepared to have us shot when we do it without orders. Such instinct is so strong that Zippo tactics are practiced even by the victors advancing into newly conquered territory. It was practiced on a large scale by the Russians as they conquered Prussia in 1944--they intended to keep Prussia for themselves, these in effect were their own new houses, to conquer them they had shed much blood, yet they burned them. Zippo tactics were very much in fashion during Operation Storm, the Croat conquest of Serb Krajina in 1995. On that occasion, no squeals of indignation were heard from NATO governments, let alone threats. It is heartening to see such moral growth taking place in western capitals over the short span of four years.

To express shock that Serb thugs, whose families for more than 20 years were terrorized by Albanian thugs, may be settling accounts in the midst of a NATO intervention which many Albanians asked for, is disingenuous. Everyone expected a general settling of accounts, and all western reporters in Pristina knew it was coming. All important people in Washington, London, Paris, and Bonn, knew it was going to happen but accepted the "unavoidable risks": few western editors or politicians own property in Kosovo. It is unquestionable that the western media performed the function of creating the atmosphere that was necessary to start this little war.

Here is how this war was delivered. Film and pictures showing the ravages of war are shown. Pressure for some action, any action, is brought to bear. A fake massacre is set up in Racak, where during heavy fighting about 40 Kosovo Albanians lose their life. A few French journalists challenge the tale of murder, pointing out serious inconsistencies, while everyone else drinks it up. Orders, then threats are sent to Belgrade. When little Slobodan dares to shrug his shoulders at the nervous young schoolteacher, the media boys snicker audibly. Now it is a matter of face, the schoolteacher has to issue his final warning, and pulls out his ruler, terrified at the idea of losing control of the class. The only thing that could now save the teacher from doing something stupid would be the entry of an older teacher.

If this were a bar, Mr. Clinton would have to start swinging unless his buddies held him back. When in 1953 Mr. Dulles, who run US foreign policy, developed the brilliant scheme of dropping atomic weapons upon the Vietnamese guerrillas, who were fighting for independence from France, their colonial master, he was saved by the French refusal to cooperate. When Mr. Dulles resolved to step into France' s colonial war in Indochina with conventional forces, it was Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden who saved him. Now, in 1999, at the Bar Balkan, the President's buddies are egging him on. The allies now are socialists and greenies who are so moral and sensitive that they fall for the old crying baby trick: set a cradle in a swamp, give a kick to the cradle, set the baby crying, and all the sensitive socialists and liberals will jump into the swamp and get stuck. In 1999 there was no Churchill, there was no realist ally to save the President.

"Mr. President, you give us the picture, we will give you the war." I don't know if the publisher Hearst really said that to Teddy Roosevelt in 1898, but it certainly perfectly describes the function which the western press played in the destruction of the Second Yugoslavia. From the rape camps story to the fake concentration camp of Trnopolje from the shelling of Sarajevo and Dubrovnik to the breadline and the marketplace self-bombings in Sarajevo there is a direct line, leading to the Drenica and the Racak fake massacres. I firmly believe that the Serbs, just like the Albanians, committed massacres and atrocities, but we ought to try to discover what drives the western media to report the grisly details of fake atrocities. Many in the media suffer from a perverse passion for unreality, like someone who can afford a plane ticket to Italy but chooses to go see Rome without perplexing, troublesome, non-English speaking Romans. All delivered in a nice, neat, comfortable, predictable package, in Las Vegas or in Disneyland. I am sure there are Serb Auschwitzes to be found, but the western media chooses to visit Disneyland Auschwitzes instead. On the other hand, the ethnic cleansing committed by Albanians against defenseless Serbs and Montenegrins since the 1970's is ignored. Not surprising, since no one would accuse TV news or newspaper editors of reading history books during their spare time. One thing I find surprising, however, is that the media choose to ignore great current stories like the crematorium for 22 disappeared Yugoslavs discovered in Klecka a few months ago. When I say Yugoslavs I mean Serbs, Montenegrins, Roms, and even Albanians who did not want to start a war and leave a state that had provided them with unprecedented cultural, religious, and political freedom and educational opportunities. I have no doubt that there has been mention of Klecka in the western press. The problem is the lack of repetition. What is repeated becomes history, what is mentioned once becomes a footnote. To all practical effects footnotes are not history. Footnotes are not part of the political discourse, they will never be discussed in a panel discussion on television. Footnotes go down Orwell's memory hole. They never happened. Klecka does not exist. Klecka never happened.

How can we explain such unfairness from the western media? Advertising. The Yugo vs. the BMW. Who would buy a Yugo when he is offered a free BMW? At the start of the break-up of the Second Yugoslavia, a perfectly tuned and well financed advertising campaign convinced western public opinion that the Serbs were primitive monsters. Everyone believed such demonization. I can personally report that I fell for it. The advertisements of the Yugoslavs were inept, stiff, and stilted. No one believed them, and after a while they came to be totally ignored. If you believe that an Edsel or a Yugo is a bad car, you will not buy it, not now, not next year, even if they have a new, improved, pretty good model. The western media decided that the Yugo was a bad car, period. Any urban legend about the Yugo was accepted. Any Serb fake massacre story sold. Western newsmen, publishers, and politicians believed them. If you challenged the stories you would be attacked as a supporter of genocide.

One of the best advertising success stories of the war revolves around the concentration camp of Trnopolje. The picture of a group of men behind barbed wire, one of them severely emaciated, in August 1992, shocked the world into realizing that genocide and death camps had come back to Europe and that something had to be done now to stop a new Hitler. The problem was that these men were not prisoners. They were refugees, but they were not behind barbed wire. The television crew had entered a barbed wire enclosure and from inside was shooting a group of men who were outside. This fake is still used, now in slow motion for added emotional impact, in television hate propaganda against Serbia and the President solemnly refers to it in his noble war speeches.

While I have a prejudice in trusting that the newsman on the spot, like the military man in the field, is trying to do the best job he can under the circumstances, I am a firm believer in the stupidity and deep ignorance of media editors and politicos. Should the reader prefer a more conspiratorial view of history, in which some "New Order" or "New (World) Order" pulls the strings that lead us into one military confrontation after another, for fun and profit, I will have to reserve judgement. But I will end this chat with an ancient quote by a dissident who eighty years ago was very pessimist about the motives of media and politicians in their world-wide search for enemies whom they create, strengthen, and finally demonize. Thus wrote H.L.Menckhen: "The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace in a continuous state of alarm (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing them with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary."